The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 ("DTSA") was the product of a multi-year effort to federalize trade secret protection. In the final stages of drafting the DTSA, Senators Grassley and Leahy introduced an important new element: immunity "for whistleblowers who share confidential information in the course of reporting suspected illegal activity to law enforcement or when filing a lawsuit, provided they do so under seal." The meaning and scope of this provision are of vital importance to enforcing health, safety, civil rights, financial market, consumer, and environmental protections and deterring fraud against the government, shareholders, and the public. This article explains how the whistleblower immunity provision was formulated and offers insights into its proper interpretation.
This historic legislation was the product of a multi-year effort to federalize trade secret protection. 3 In the final stages of drafting the law, Senators Chuck Grassley and Patrick Leahy introduced an important new element: immunity "for whistleblowers who share confidential information in the course of reporting suspected illegal activity to law enforcement or when filing a lawsuit, provided they do so under seal." 4 The meaning and scope of this provision are of vital importance to enforcing health, safety, civil rights, financial market, consumer, and environmental protections and deterring fraud against the government, shareholders, and the public. Unlike other aspects of the DTSA, the whistleblower immunity provision emerged toward the end of the legislative process and was not the subject of formal hearings.
5
Senator Leahy's remarks on the Senate floor on the day that the Senate unanimously approved the DTSA summarize the provision's rationale and note a source for its formulation: (Jan. 28, 2016) , https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-grassley-amendment-to-protect-whistleblowers_earns-unanimous-support-in-judiciary-committee [hereinafter Press Release] .
5. In the most thorough analysis of the general legislative history of the DTSA, Research and Instructional Services Librarian John Cannan merely summarized the whistleblower immunity provision. Act of 2016 , SSRN 26-27 (May 4, 2016 , https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2775390.
See John Cannan, A (Mostly) Legislative History of the Defend Trade Secrets
Today, the Senate voted on legislation that will provide a valuable tool to protect against trade secret theft. This legislation is supported by businesses from diverse sectors of our economy, including companies large and small. . . . The Defend Trade Secrets Act contains a bipartisan provision I offered with Senator Grassley to ensure that employers and other entities cannot bully whistleblowers or other litigants by threatening them with a lawsuit for trade secret theft. The provision protects disclosures made in confidence to law enforcement or an attorney for the purpose of reporting a suspected violation of law and disclosures made in the course of a lawsuit, provided that the disclosure is made under seal. It requires employers to provide clear notice of this protection in any nondisclosure agreements they ask individuals to sign. This commonsense public policy amendment is supported by the Project on Government Oversight and the Government Accountability Project and builds upon valuable scholarly work by Professor Peter Menell. 6 This article explains how the whistleblower immunity provision was formulated and offers insights into its proper interpretation. Before turning to the crafting of the provision, I retrace the scholarly journey that motivated the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision.
II. PROLOGUE
I begin with the story of Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, part of the inspiration for the whistleblower immunity provision. Dr. Wigand was a public health research scientist who became one of the most famous whistleblowers in United States history. 7 He was the subject of a "mishandled" 60 Minutes episode 8 that provided the basis for "The Insider," a riveting motion picture exposing the tobacco industry's efforts to suppress disclosure of its insidious efforts to increase the addictiveness of cigarettes. 6. 162 CONG. REC. S1636-37 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy was referring to a draft of the article referenced in note *. The final version of that article faithfully reflects the text and analysis of the draft version that attracted the Senate Judiciary Committee's attention. The only substantial change in the article was the addition of Part V, which summarizes the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision. The reason for this addition was that passage of the DTSA leapfrogged the publication process (the article was accepted in February 2015, several months before passage of the DTSA). Parts I-IV of the article, which provided the basis for the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision, were published as initially submitted apart from modest formatting edits so as to preserve a record of the foundation for the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision.
7. See Cassi Feldman, 60 Minutes' Most Famous Whistleblower, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES OVERTIME (Feb. 4, 2016) , https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-most-famous-whistleblower/ (quoting 60 Minutes Executive Producer Jeff Fager observing that "[t]he story itself was one of the most -probably the most important story that was ever reported by 60 Minutes."); see also 
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Wigand was led to believe that he would be developing a safer cigarette.
11
In the course of his work, Dr. Wigand learned that the company was looking for ways to make cigarettes more addictive through nicotine-impact boosting-the use of ammonia and other chemicals to enhance nicotine absorption in the lungs.
12
Dr. Wigand's unwillingness to support this effort ultimately led to his firing in March 1993.
13
Dr. Wigand believed that he was barred from disclosing confidential information, including information pertaining to B&W's efforts to make cigarettes more addictive, because he had signed a non-disclosure agreement ("NDA").
14 Dr. Wigand reassessed his adherence to the broad terms of the NDA after he became suspicious that B&W had sabotaged his efforts to find gainful employment. Nonetheless, Dr. Wigand testified in a Mississippi suit in which the state sought reimbursement from the tobacco industry for the welfare and health care costs associated with illnesses arising from the use of tobacco products. 25 This and parallel litigation in other states alleging claims for restitution and unjust enrichment on the basis of tobacco companies' "wrongful conduct" and common law public nuisance 26 ultimately resulted in settlements totaling hundreds of billions of dollars and bringing about substantial changes in the industry.
27
III.
SUBVERSION OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
This story brought to light a disturbing misuse of trade secret protection. A major tobacco company subverted legal protections designed to promote socially beneficial innovation so as to maximize corporate profits at the expense of public health. As even a cursory examination of the history of corruption and fraud litigation reveals, such abuse has not been limited to a few bad actors or questionable industries. Many of the most significant public health and environmental problems, corrupt practices, and fraudulent activities-including the asbestos toxicity cover- Rising, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 1996) , http://articles.latimes.com/1996-04-25/news/mn-62701_1_tobacco-industry; Michael Janofsky, Philip Morris Accuses ABC of Libel, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 1994) (June 20, 2014, 3:51 PM) , http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2014/06/20/health-care-employers-take-note-newweapons-are-available-when-defending-false-claims-act-suits (reporting on cases allowing counterclaims against whistleblowers for taking documents and observing that the "takeaway" for employers was that they have "more defense options in qui tam suits brought by employees who impermissibly disclose protected health information (PHI) or other confidential employer information"); see also 44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (noting that trade secret protection can "implicate the interest in freedom of expression or advance another significant public interest" and a "privilege is likely to be recognized . . . in connection with the disclosure of information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public concern").
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Although many states have adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, there is growing interest in passing a broad federal trade secrets statute for several reasons: (1) to strengthen U.S. protection for intellectual property by bringing trade secrets on par with patents, copyrights, and trademarks as a national, federal regime; (2) to address the growing tide of international trade secret theft by adding a robust "seizure" provision that would give federal courts power to enter ex parte seizure orders before trade secrets can leave the country; and (3) to promote a nationally uniform trade secrets regime-businesses wish to reduce the uncertainty of doing business in many states with different rules.
While I generally support such legislation as a way to promote technological innovation, I worry that the focus on strengthening trade secret protections could exacerbate an existing problem of trade secret protection-the widespread use of non-disclosure agreements to deter employees and contractors from disclosing illegal and fraudulent activities to government officials. For example, corporations routinely require employees to sign broad confidentiality agreements with sometimes excessive liquidated damages provisions and arbitration clauses that restrict reporting wrongdoing to the government. If an individual faces a potential lawsuit for crushing liability (not to mention the costs of defending such a lawsuit and the adverse effects on future employment prospects) for disclosing information that could be considered a trade secret, he or she may not be willing to risk reporting information. I worry that a federal trade secret law will become a bigger cudgel to prevent whistleblowers from providing information about violations of law to the appropriate authorities. I would also like to see state trade secret laws blunted so as to avoid these undesirable effects on ferreting out illegal and fraudulent activities.
I am considering proposing a "public policy" safe harbor to address these concerns. I anticipate that there will be substantial opposition to any "public policy" limitation on trade secret protection from the Chamber of Commerce and other pro-business groups. It is critical that we anticipate their concerns and address them in a balanced manner.
Here is a sketch of what I have in mind: • Immunity from Liability for Confidential Disclosure of Trade Secret Information to the Government: An individual who discloses information, either directly or through his or her lawyer, in confidence to a federal, state, or local government official, or files a lawsuit or initiates a proceeding filed under seal in connection with a whistleblower program, solely for the purpose of investigating a violation of law is not subject to suit under federal (or state) trade secret law for that disclosure.
• Attorney-Client Privilege: This immunity extends to the whistleblower's attorney so long as the attorney does not disclose or use the information outside of representing the whistleblower in reporting the alleged illegal conduct.
• Exception: If the person disclosed or used the information for nonlaw enforcement purposes, such as starting a competing business or discussing the information in the press, he or she cannot benefit from the safe harbor.
• Use of Trade Secret Information in Anti-Retaliation Lawsuits: A person bringing a lawsuit for retaliation by an employer for the reporting of a violation of law may share the trade secret information with their attorney and use the trade secret information in the court proceeding without violating federal (or state) trade secret law so long as they file the information under seal and do not disclose the information except pursuant to court order.
• Notice: All non-disclosure agreements must include notice of the public policy safe harbor. Failure to include this notice shall make the agreement null and void.
Please prepare a short memo (four to six paragraphs) addressing the pros and cons of the "public policy" safe harbor proposal. Feel free to suggest any improvements, changes, or issues that should be considered.
IV. FORMULATING THE WHISTLEBLOWER IMMUNITY PROPOSAL
This foray into the social justice and public policy ramifications of trade secret law piqued my curiosity. I added exploration of a public policy exception to trade secret protection to my summer research agenda. In addition to tracing the history of trade secret protection, I embarked on a deep dive into the social science literature on whistleblowers and the personnel management literature on onboarding of employees.
45

A. The Trade Secrecy/Law Enforcement Tension
The emergence and evolution of trade secret protection explained why state trade secrets statutes had not included a public policy limitation. The trade secrets regime emerged in response to the economic upheaval of the Industrial Revolution. Before the nineteenth century, an informal system of social norms afforded craftsmen effective protection for most technological advances.
46
Craftsmen passed along their trade knowledge to their apprentices with the understanding that the knowhow would be kept secret during the apprenticeship period. After this training, the apprentice was free to practice the trade. Custom, trade-guilds, and close-knit communities reinforced these trust-based protections.
The rise of factories and increased employee mobility during the Industrial Revolution eroded the small-scale, localized social norm system that had adequately safeguarded trade knowledge in the preindustrial age. Recognizing the need for commercial morality and technological progress in the rapidly industrializing economy, 47 courts gradually developed a common law tort-based regime for protecting 45 . The discussion in this section summarizes the analysis in Menell, supra note *. That article provides more detailed analysis and references for the summary that follows.
46. These protections were augmented by the patent system, which afforded protection for larger, discrete advances. [t] his is not legitimate competition, which it is always the policy of the law to foster and encourage, but it is contra bonos mores [against good morals], and constitutes a breach of trust which a court of law, and much less a court of equity, should not tolerate").
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48
Trade secret protection could encompass information that was not generally known to the public so long as the employer undertook reasonable precautions to preserve secrecy. 49 This latter requirement brought NDAs into common practice. Failure to guard against disclosure of trade secrets by employees and contractors would jeopardize trade secret protection.
Thus, trade secret protection emerged and largely crystallized before the vast expansion of the government's role in regulating economic activity. 50 Over the course of the past century and a half-encompassing the Progressive, New Deal, Civil Rights, Environmental Protection, and Information Eras-the federal and state governments have assumed a much larger role in regulating product and service markets, worker safety, civil rights, public health, the environment, securities markets, and information technologies. cies encouraging reporting of regulatory violations, fraud, and tax evasion. In addition, they enacted and strengthened laws encouraging citizens to come forward with information revealing fraud against the government.
56
As government regulations and compliance with government contracts increasingly hit corporate bottom lines, many companies came to see trade secret protections as a tool not only to discourage commercial threats but also to manage exposure to enforcement risks. Violations of regulatory requirements, environmental standards, civil rights laws, and military specifications of government contractslike corporate know-how and technological process advances-are not directly observable to the public or government regulators. By using NDAs to silence employees and contractors, companies could evade responsibility and control their exposure to liability. Consequently, many companies came to see trade secrets as encompassing all confidential information within the enterprise, not just technological information that could provide commercial advantage. In this way, trade secret protection was subverted from its historical and intended purposes of promoting commercial morality and technological progress.
As my initial foray into the interplay of trade secret protection and whistleblowing revealed, 57 courts recognize that disclosure of a trade secret protection for non-commercial purposes can "implicate the interest in freedom of expression or advance another significant public interest," 58 and developed a limited privilege to disclose trade secrets.
59
This privilege, however, is murky. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition notes that the exception: depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the nature of the information, the purpose of the disclosure, and the means by which the actor acquired the information. A privilege is likely to be recognized, for example, in connection with the disclosure of information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public concern.
60
This framing offers relatively little clarity or assurance to prospective whistleblowers. At a minimum, its characterization as a defense that turns on a case-bycase balancing of potentially subjective factors means that an employee or contractor who divulges proprietary information to the government could be sued for breach of an NDA. 
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[Vol. 1 2017 attorney, with the attendant costs, and face some exposure. Moreover, most prospective whistleblowers will not even be aware of this exception to their NDA without such a consultation. This inquiry begged the question: was this limited, murky privilege sufficient to overcome the strong forces suppressing whistleblowing by the relatively few key employees and contractors best positioned to uncover illegal activity?
B. The Interplay of Trade Secrecy and Whistleblowing
To analyze the effects of NDAs and trade secret law on whistleblowing, I turned to management and social science research on corporate onboarding practices, socialization within corporate environments, and whistleblowing. This research revealed that potential whistleblowers face a gauntlet of legal impediments, indoctrination policies, financial risks, and workplace and social pressures discouraging reporting of illegal conduct.
61
As the authors of an empirical study examining 230 corporate fraud scenarios at large U.S. companies concluded, "[g]iven the costs [of whistleblowing], the surprising part is not that most employees do not talk, but that some talk at all." 62 These costs include not only litigation costs, but also damage to the whistleblowers' future employment prospects. As the attorney for Jim Bingham, a former accountant who successfully blew the whistle on Xerox, 63 observed, "Jim had a great career, but he'll never get a job in Corporate America again."
64
From their first day on the job, employees and contractors are introduced to an array of legal and institutional measures intended to dissuade them from disclosing information that could adversely affect their employer. Thereafter, many companies condition employees through carrots and sticks to place the company's profitability above all else. Employees quickly come to realize the benefits of loyalty and the professional, social, psychological, and other consequences that befall those who dare to expose corporate misdeeds. Those employees who come forward typically experience a mix of specific, tangible economic harms as well as social ostracization.
The widespread use of broad NDAs plays a central role in creating an environment in which employees and contractors feel duty-bound to stay silent about illegal activity. To ensure compliance with trade secret law, companies routinely require that corporate employees and contractors sign an NDA before they can begin work. This process is typically handled by a human resources employee who explains the terms of the agreement. Many larger enterprises use formal orientation programs. Such meetings emphasize the importance of trade secrets to the company and the breadth of the NDA. Most employees and contractors do not seek or obtain independent counsel. For the unsophisticated and the legally savvy alike, NDAs can be confusing, intimidating documents, and employees who sign them often lack any leverage to negotiate terms. The express terms of NDAs appear to bar whistleblowing. Aside from being formal and often fairly technical, most NDAs are broadly worded.
65
They typically reference and bar the disclosure of every conceivable form of information that might be deemed confidential. Before the passage of the DTSA, NDAs did not mention any public policy exception or justification for reporting confidential information to law enforcement officials.
Such blanket framing communicates that any disclosure of confidential information to persons outside of the company would breach the agreement and thereby expose the employee or contractor to termination and liability for damages. Even though whistleblowers are unlikely to cause compensable damage by reporting illegal activity to the government or a lawyer, many will be discouraged by the strong terms of the NDA from even seeking outside counsel. They might reasonably infer from the NDA's strict and broad terms that even explaining their concerns to an attorney could potentially breach the NDA. And based on the murkiness of the former public policy exception, cautious attorneys could not provide full assurance that the whistleblower will be shielded from liability. The safest course of action for NDA signatories was to never disclose information about the company's business practices. The end result, likely intended by the company, is that NDAs foster a culture of corporate loyalty and secrecy.
Many companies reinforce the legal restrictions of NDAs with formal and informal processes aimed at integrating employees into a corporate culture that discourages both trade secret leaks and whistleblowing. For many companies, the I shall not disclose to any person, either inside the Company to employees without a need to know, or outside the Company, or use at any time, either during or after termination of employment, except as required in my duties to the Company, any secret or confidential information, whether or not developed by me, unless I shall first obtain written consent of the President of the Company or unless such information shall have become general public knowledge by any means other than disclosure by me. Secret or confidential information shall include, but not be limited to, acquisition or merger negotiations or information, know-how, designs, formulas, processes, devices, machines, inventions, research or development projects, plans for future development, materials of a business nature, financial data, legal documents and records, trade secrets, processes, formula data, techniques, know-how, improvements, inventions, marketing plans, strategies, forecasts, pricing information, customer information, work procedures, personnel and labor relations information, product specifications, financial information, models, blueprints, drawings, vendor information, proprietary information of other persons that has been disclosed to the Company and any other information of a similar nature in a form or to the extent not available to the public. Id. at *3. The New Jersey appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of a pharmaceutical employee on the ground that the NDA was unenforceable due to its over breadth. Id. at *1. Such challenges, however, are exceedingly rare.
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66
This process can extend for months or even years.
67
The goal-or, at the least, one of the foremost goals-is to begin to mold everyday workers into fiercely loyal employees who will align their own interest with that of the company.
Once employees are onboarded, many firms reinforce loyalty through internal branding.
68
These efforts can be in the form of training sessions, expanded compensation opportunities based on employee engagement, and specifically focused evaluation criteria. The overarching goal is to create lasting bonds between the company and its workers such that employees align their thinking with that of the owners of the firm. [M] anagement theorists and business consultants recommend that firms invest at least as much in internal marketing to employees -that is, selling the corporate brand inside the firm -as they do in external advertising campaigns directed at consumers. By managing employees' identities and aligning them with the firm's brand, employers can nurture an emotional attachment to the firm that yields a significant payoff in employee loyalty and productivity, and, ultimately, in customer satisfaction and loyalty.").
69. Id. at 1200 ("Employees are persuaded to internalize brand values through a systemic recruiting, training, development, and compensation program that fosters a psychological commitment to the firm and a 'consciousness of kind' that translates into deeper attachment to the firm. The goal is to produce a workforce that reacts and behaves instinctively 'on-brand,' effectively managing itself."). assess whether an exception should apply in a particular case. 73 The factors to be balanced vary and can be subjective.
Not only do differing tests lead to uncertain consequences for the whistleblowers who risk their livelihoods, 74 but the application of any balancing test, as opposed to a clear safe harbor, is itself problematic. Most whistleblowers considering reporting information about misconduct to the government are not represented by counsel when they need to decide what information to provide the government and are not in a position to anticipate how a court in an undetermined jurisdiction will evaluate those choices. Even if the whistleblower is represented by counsel, the lawyer will often be hard-pressed to provide definitive advice.
The decisions in Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, 75 serve as a cautionary tale of the risks that whistleblowers face. While working as a Chief Scientist at General Dynamics C4 Systems ("GDC4S"), a government aerospace contractor, Mary Cafasso became aware of corporate decisions that she believed to be in violation of the company's obligations under its government contracts.
76
She reported these concerns internally, but her warnings went unheeded.
77
Upon learning that her position was being eliminated, she hurriedly downloaded a large number of confidential files that could support her suspicions.
78
GDC4S learned of Cafasso's removal of proprietary documents and filed suit against her in state court for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and conversion.
79
Shortly thereafter, Cafasso filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act ("FCA").
80
GDC4S then asserted counterclaims in the federal action based on breach of the NDA, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and other claims based on her removal of computer files as part of her qui tam action. 81 After granting summary judgment in favor of GDC4S on Cafasso's FCA action, the district court turned to GDC4S's counterclaims.
82
The court readily determined that Cafasso's disclosure of the documents in question to her attorney constituted a breach of her NDA.
83
The court rejected a public policy privilege, noting that:
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[p]ublic policy does not immunize Cafasso. Cafasso confuses protecting whistleblowers from retaliation for lawfully reporting fraud with immunizing whistleblowers for wrongful acts made in the course of looking for evidence of fraud. The limitation of statutory protection for retaliation to "lawful acts done by the employee" weighs against any inference of a broad privilege for Cafasso to breach her contract with GDC4S. Statutory incentives encouraging investigation of possible fraud under the FCA do not establish a public policy in favor of violating an employer's contractual confidentiality and nondisclosure rights by wholesale copying of files admittedly containing confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information.
84
The court granted GDC4S summary judgment on its breach of contract claim.
85
It also held that Cafasso's actions caused irreparable harm and were not immunized by the FCA.
86
The court ordered Cafasso to pay $300,000 in attorneys' fees for the breach of contract action.
87
The court rejected Cafasso's argument that such an award could deter future qui tam plaintiffs from pursuing claims on the ground that:
Cafasso's claims under the False Claims Act and GDC4S's breach of contract claims and counterclaims do not have a reciprocal relationship. The award poses no threat to False Claims Act plaintiffs who perform a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law underlying their claim and avail themselves of the discovery under the law.
88
Yet the breach of contract action was based in substantial part on Cafasso's disclosure to her attorney of the proprietary documents on which she based her qui tam action.
89
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court rulings.
90
The court declined to adopt a public policy exception in a case involving "vast and indiscriminate appropriation" of confidential files, even for the purpose of reporting allegedly illegal activity to her attorney and to the government.
91
The court emphasized the overbreadth of the document retrieval, notwithstanding that Cafasso was under tremendous time pressure in gathering the documents.
92
The court expressed concern about the sensitivity of the information, yet it was all information that Cafasso was authorized to view. 93 Cafasso limited disclosure to her attorney (who was also duty- Ariz. Nov. 4, 2009 ), aff'd, 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011 . The court reduced the award of $575,415 to $300,000 as a result of the "possibility of extreme hardship" and Cafasso having devoted over 5,000 hours during the prior three years to the litigation and the depletion of her savings. bound to protect the information) and the government through a sealed qui tam filing.
94
Nevertheless, the court concluded that:
[a]n exception broad enough to protect the scope of Cafasso's massive document gather in this case would make all confidentiality agreements unenforceable as long as the employee later files a qui tam action. See JDS Uniphase Corp. v. Jennings, 473 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702 (E.D. Va. 2007 ) (" [E] mployees would feel free to haul away proprietary documents, computers, or hard drives, in contravention of their confidentiality agreements, knowing they could later argue they needed the documents to pursue suits against employers. . . ."). Were we to adopt a public policy exception to confidentiality agreements to protect relators-a matter we reserve for another day-those asserting its protection would need to justify why removal of the documents was reasonably necessary to pursue an FCA claim. Cafasso has made no such particularized showing.
95
Such a "particularized showing" puts whistleblowers in the difficult position of having to carefully screen documents, often under extreme time pressure and otherwise stressful circumstances. A whistleblower will not necessarily know what documents they will need to support a claim, and documents can be evanescentdisappearing if they are not preserved.
In another case that recognized a public policy exception for whistleblowers, the district court nonetheless allowed a counterclaim to go forward. In Siebert v. Gene Security Network, Inc., the court cited Cafasso and concluded that enforcing a confidentiality agreement to suppress evidence of fraud would frustrate Congress's intent in enacting the FCA-to encourage whistleblowing. 96 However, the court allowed the parties to determine through discovery if the relator took documents unrelated to the FCA claim.
97
But the prospect of potentially prevailing against a counterclaim-requiring a nonlawyer relator to establish that documents are "relevant" to a false claim-is little solace to a person contemplating reporting alleged wrongdoing to the government. Having to respond to discovery, retain counsel, and face possible liability would discourage many whistleblowers from reporting at all.
The net effect of corporate onboarding policies, broad NDAs, and murky legal standards for determining whether an employee or contractor who seeks to report allegedly illegal activities to the government is to place potential whistleblowers in a While there are potential defenses to breach of contract and trade secret claims against whistleblowers who use proprietary information for reporting allegedly illegal activity, the prospect of having to hire a lawyer to defend against such claims has a significant deterrent effect on whistleblowers. As the Cafasso case illustrates, the act of sharing the allegedly incriminating information with an 94. Id. at 1052 . 95. Id. at 1062 . 96. See Siebert v. Gene Sec. Network, No. 11-cv-01987, 2013 WL 5645309, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2013 .
97. Id. 98. Drawing on the clever plot device employed repeatedly in Joseph Heller's 1961 blockbuster novel of the same name, a "Catch-22" is "a problematic situation for which the only solution is denied by a circumstance inherent in the problem or by a rule." Catch-22, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catch%2022 (last visited Dec. 5, 2017).
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It became clear that routine NDAs that are essential to safeguarding trade secrets can be subverted to chill those in the best position to reveal illegal activity. I next turned my attention to finding a solution to this problem that did not undermine the protection of trade secrets that promote commercial morality and technological progress.
C. Tailoring a Trade Secret Public Policy Exception
I came to realize that there were two keys to solving the trade secrecy/whistleblower puzzle. First, the empirical studies show that most whistleblowers are not interested in undermining an employer's lawful commercial advantage. They are not seeking to divulge a company's innovative process technology to competitors. Nor are they seeking to compete with the employer. Rather, they are driven by moral and social desires to prevent, halt, or rectify illegal activity. They seek to promote the social good, not something that is inconsistent with the guiding principles of trade secret protection: commercial morality and technological advance. It is ironic that a legal regime grounded in promoting commercial morality has stood in the way of ferreting out illegal activity. Such misconduct undermines commercial and social morality.
Second, existing confidentiality rules within the legal profession 100 and government institutions provide safeguards against disclosure of trade secrets by attorney and government officials. Government agencies routinely deal with trade secrets and follow strict rules for ensuring that this information remains confidential.
101
The Freedom of Information Act exempts trade secrets from public disclosure.
102
More generally, the federal government holds federal officers and employees strictly accountable for disclosing trade secrets to the public without authorization. The Trade Secrets Act provides that:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof . . . publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets . . . shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment. 103 Furthermore, trade secret owners whose trade secrets have been violated by improper government disclosure can pursue compensatory damages through an action filed with the U.S. Court of Claims. 104 Thus, reporting of allegedly illegal activity by employees and contractors subject to NDAs can be reconciled with the protection of trade secret law by immunizing whistleblowers from trade secret liability so long as they maintain the secrecy of confidential information. This can be accomplished by authorizing individuals subject to NDAs to share confidential information with what I refer to as "trusted intermediaries": government officials and attorneys legally bound to safeguard proprietary information. Thus, disclosure of even substantial amounts of proprietary information to a trusted intermediary-an attorney, court, or government officialdoes not jeopardize trade secrecy.
Such a regime enables potential whistleblowers to obtain legal advice without risk of liability for trade secret misappropriation. It also provides government enforcers with access to critical information about compliance with the law, government contracts, and other vital areas of public concern.
My research demonstrated the critical importance of affording potential whistleblowers with a clear safe harbor that would not expose them to the costs and risks of trade secret litigation. As the Cafasso case illustrated, 105 having to defend a trade secret misappropriation case threatens crushing liability. Apart from disclosing trade secrets to her attorney and the government under seal, the defendant in that case maintained the secrecy of the confidential information at issue.
106
Yet, the case resulted in costly litigation. 107 Therefore, I proposed that Congress immunize potential whistleblowers from liability, not merely codify a defense to liability. As prior case law establishes, an immunity from suit affords a defendant the ability to resolve litigation as early in the litigation as possible. The Supreme Court and all circuit courts that have addressed the procedural requirements of qualified immunity issues have held that the 103. 18 U.S. C. § 1905 (2012 ). 104. See Demodulation, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 794, 813 (2012 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding that that trade secrets constitute property interests pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and finding that the EPA effected a taking of private property requiring just compensation where the agency used, pursuant to statute, confidential studies submitted by one pesticide manufacturer in evaluating similar pesticides submitted for approval by another manufacturer). 105. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79, 81-95. 106. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics Sys., Inc., No. CV06-1381 -PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 1457036, at *13 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2009 ). 107. Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., No. CV06-1381 -PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 3723087, at *4-9. (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2009 ), aff'd, 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011 .
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My ultimate proposed whistleblower immunity provision closely paralleled the spring 2015 exam question that inspired this project:
i. Immunity from Liability for Confidential Disclosure of Trade Secret Information to the Government: An individual who discloses information, either directly or through an attorney, in confidence to a federal, state, or local government official, or files a lawsuit or initiates a proceeding filed under seal in connection with a whistleblower program, solely for the purpose of investigating a violation of law is not subject to suit under federal or state trade secret law for that disclosure.
Attorney Immunity:
This immunity extends to the whistleblower's attorney so long as the attorney does not disclose or use the information outside of representing the whistleblower in reporting the alleged illegal conduct.
Exception:
This immunity does not apply to persons who disclose or use the information for non-law enforcement purposes, such as starting a competing business or communicating the trade secret information to the press. ii. Use of Trade Secret Information in Anti-Retaliation Lawsuit: A person bringing a lawsuit for retaliation by an employer for reporting any violation of law including fraud against the government may disclose the trade secret information to their attorney and use the trade secret information in the court proceeding so long as they file the information under seal and do not disclose the information except pursuant to court order.
iii. Notice: All non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) must include reasonable notice of the public policy safe exception set forth in clauses (i) and (ii). Notice of clauses (i) and (ii) in NDAs is a prerequisite for enforcing these agreements in federal courts. Failure to provide notice of the public policy exception shall bar recovery of exemplary damages and attorneys' fees in any trade secret misappropriation action.
V.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DTSA WHISTLEBLOWER IMMUNITY PROVISION I completed a draft of "Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection" in early November 2015, just as I was heading to Washington, D.C. for an annual patent law conference that I co-organize with Georgetown University Law Center ("GULC"). To my surprise, she said that she was interested in discussing the DTSA. I learned that the DTSA was moving through the legislative process, Senators Leahy and Grassley were interested in addressing the whistleblower problem, and the Senate Judiciary Committee staff was intrigued by the approach set forth in my draft article. We exchanged email addresses and agreed to communicate the following week.
Within a few days of the GULC-BCLT Patent Law Conference, the Senate Judiciary Committee staff vetted a whistleblower immunity provision modeled on the proposal in my article among DTSA stakeholders. In early January 2016, I forwarded a commentary that I had posted on Columbia Law School's Blue Sky Blog. 112 The Judiciary Committee provided me with a draft of the whistleblower immunity amendment that Senators Leahy and Grassley planned to introduce later that month. The language implemented nearly verbatim, the core elements of my proposal. I was especially pleased to see that staff had framed the provision as "immunity" from liability and not merely a defense to liability. We discussed ensuring that the provision applied to anyone, whether an employee or a contractor, who signs an NDA. Senator Leahy: "My amendment along with Senator Grassley ensures that companies do not intimidate whistleblowers by threatening them with laws for trade secret theft. Now Senator Grassley and I have worked together for years and years on whistleblower efforts and I am glad to continue the work. I have two letters of support that I would like to include for the record from the supporter groups." Senator Grassley: "[They] will be included." Senator Leahy: "[The amendment] is carefully written to ensure that the disclosures are protected or that they are made to law enforcement in confidence or filed with a court under seal. They do not protect unlawful activities. I think that it is a good amendment and I would move its adoption. Senator Grassley: "And I have a statement in favor [of the amendment] that I will put in the record without objection. Those in favor of the amendment . . . Senator Feinstein: "May I say one thing about this amendment." Senator Grassley: "Yes, please."
114. See S. 1890, 114 th Cong. (2016) (proposed amendment to Chapter 90 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Leahy-Grassley1%20-%20ALB16037.pdf. In addition, Senator Leahy submitted a statement into the record stating in pertinent part: I appreciate that the bill's sponsors worked with me to improve this legislation, which is critical for Vermont businesses. I also thank Chairman Grassley for working with me on an amendment to provide needed protections for whistleblowers who share confidential information in the course of reporting suspected illegal activity to law enforcement or when filing a lawsuit, provided they do so under seal. Our amendment is supported by the Government Accountability Project and the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), and I look forward to its adoption. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 4.
Corporations have turned to well-financed litigation 'slap suits' seeking bankruptcy and financial ruin, to achieve a greater chilling effect than merely firing a whistleblower.
The narrow U.S. boundaries to protect freedom of speech have become highly outdated. Almost half the world's whistleblower laws in twelve other nations, from Australia to Serbia, now protect against civil or criminal liability. Expanding the scope of protection beyond employment harassment is necessary for whistleblower laws to remain relevant. You have GAP's commitment to help advocate that principle not only with trade secrets, but any other context where the truth through whistleblowing can make a difference. Leahy and Grassley have long worked together to strengthen whistleblower protections. Their amendment, which was added to the bipartisan Defend Trade Secrets Act, protects whistleblowers who share confidential information in the course of reporting suspected illegal activity to law enforcement or when filing a lawsuit, provided they do so under seal.
"Whistleblowers serve an essential role in ensuring accountability. It is important that whistleblowers have strong and effective avenues to come forward without fear of intimidation or retaliation. The amendment I authored with Senator Grassley takes another important step in our bipartisan efforts to protect whistleblowers and promote accountability," Ranking Member Leahy said.
"Too often, individuals who come forward to report wrongdoing in the workplace are punished for simply telling the truth. The amendment I championed with Senator Leahy ensures that these whistleblowers won't be slapped with allegations of trade secret theft when responsibly exposing misconduct. It's another way we can prevent retaliation and even encourage people to speak out when they witness violations of the law," Chairman Grassley said.
The Leahy-Grassley amendment is supported by the Government Accountability Project and the Project on Government Oversight (POGO).
The Defend Trade Secrets Act, coauthored by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Senator Chris Coons (D-Del.) was unanimously approved by 123. Id.
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The final version of the DTSA incorporated the Grassley-Leahy whistleblower immunity provision amendment verbatim. (1) provides for criminal and civil immunity for anyone who discloses a trade secret under two circumstances. Subparagraph (A) addresses disclosures in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official, or to an attorney, for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of the law. Subparagraph (B) applies to disclosure in a complaint or other document filed under seal in a judicial proceeding. The Committee stresses that this provision immunizes the act of disclosure in the limited circumstances set forth in the provision itself; it does not immunizes [sic] acts that are otherwise prohibited by law, such as the unlawful access of material by unauthorized means.
Section 1833(b)(2) created by this Act provides that an individual who files a lawsuit against an employer for retaliation for reporting a suspected violation of the law may disclose a trade secret to an attorney for use in the proceeding, provided the individual files any document containing the trade secret under seal and does not disclose the trade secret other than pursuant to a court order.
Section 1833(b)(3) requires notice of the immunity in this subsection to be set forth in any employment contract that governs the use of trade secrets, although an employer may choose to provide such notice by reference to a policy document setting forth the employer's reporting policy for a suspected violation of the law that provides notice of the immunity. An employer may not be awarded exemplary damages or attorney's fees under this Act against an employee to whom such notice was not provided. The notice requirements apply to contracts entered into or updated after the date of enactment of this subsection.
Section 1833(b)(4) defines the term 'employee' to include any individual performing work as a contractor or consultant.
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On April 4, 2016, the Senate passed the DTSA on a unanimous vote. 127 Senator Leahy's remarks on the Senate floor that day summarized the whistleblower immunity provision's rationale and notes a source for its approach and language:
124. Press Release, supra note 4. 125. Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. 114-153, § 7, 130 Stat. 376, 384-85 (2016) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1833). 126. S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 13 (2016) . The House Report contains identical explanatory language. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 16-17 (2016 ). 127. Richard Cowan & Andrew Chung, Senate Unanimously Approves Trade Secret Bill, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2016 , https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-secrets/senate-unanimously-approves-trade-secrets-bill-idUSKCN0X11Y3.
Today, the Senate voted on legislation that will provide a valuable tool to protect against trade secret theft. This legislation is supported by businesses from diverse sectors of our economy, including companies large and small. . . . The Defend Trade Secrets Act contains a bipartisan provision I offered with Senator Grassley to ensure that employers and other entities cannot bully whistleblowers or other litigants by threatening them with a lawsuit for trade secret theft. The provision protects disclosures made in confidence to law enforcement or an attorney for the purpose of reporting a suspected violation of law and disclosures made in the course of a lawsuit, provided that the disclosure is made under seal. It requires employers to provide clear notice of this protection in any nondisclosure agreements they ask individuals to sign. This commonsense public policy amendment is supported by the Project on Government Oversight and the Government Accountability Project and builds upon valuable scholarly work by Professor Peter Menell. 128 On April 27, 2017, the House of Representatives passed the DTSA by a margin of 410 to 2. Hence, companies, whistleblowers, counsel, and courts can best understand the meaning, scope, and intention behind the immunity provision by reference to the analysis set forth in that article.
Most importantly, the whistleblower immunity provision is structured as an immunity and not a defense. By characterizing the safe harbor as an immunity, Congress shifted the law and legal process from the employer's advantage to the employee and the public's advantage. The immunity is based on the concern that corporations can "bully" and deter potential whistleblowers through the threat of costly trade secret litigation. 132 Hence, courts should allocate the burden of proof on the trade secret owner seeking to impose liability on a potential whistleblower and resolve the applicability of the immunity provision expeditiously.
Bare allegations that a current or former employee or contractor possesses trade secret information and might disclose such information to the press or a competitor is not a sufficient basis for allowing a trade secret action to proceed. Nor is the assertion that the defendant is unaware that the former employee has provided any information to the government a sufficient basis to allow a trade secret action to proceed. The False Claims Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and various other whistle- 
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Thus, the court's role at the outset of a trade secret case is to decide whether immunity applies, with due regard for the DTSA's protected activities and public purposes. Where the employee asserts under oath that she or he disclosed company documents to government officials or an attorney in confidence solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law, the DTSA whistleblower regime requires the employer-trade secret owner to come forward with concrete evidence that the employee or contractor has shared trade secret information outside of the protected categories or for an impermissible purpose. Absent such evidence, the employee or contractor remains free to work with counsel to investigate and report alleged violations of law and immune from suit for trade secret violations. 134 Furthermore, although the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision does not bar suit for a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), theft, trespass, or hacking, 135 the scope of the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision extends to trade secret-based harms. Thus, companies cannot impose trade secret damages on a potential whistleblower who falls within the DTSA immunity ambit through a theft or trespass cause of action. If DTSA immunity applies, then the harm in such other causes of action is limited to the cost of the paper, ink, or laptop computer that was allegedly stolen or damaged, and cannot extend to the value associated with information contained on such media or device. Otherwise, the very chilling effects that Congress sought to prevent through the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision would be circumvented through these other causes of action.
